We present a family of loss-tolerant quantum strong coin flipping protocols; each protocol differing in the number of qubits employed. For a single qubit we obtain a bias of 0.4, reproducing the result of Berlín et al . [Phys. Rev. A 80, 062321 (2009)], while for two qubits we obtain a bias of 0.3975. Numerical evidence based on semi-definite programming indicates that the bias continues to decrease as the number of qubits is increased but at a rapidly decreasing rate.
It may well be that there is always a price to be paid. Specifically, it could be that loss-tolerant SCF cannot saturate Kitaev's bound. Indeed, at the end of their paper Berlín et al. raise the question of whether it is possible to devise a loss-tolerant protocol with a lower bias than theirs.
In this paper we answer this question in the affirmative by introducing a family of loss-tolerant SCF protocols, which outperforms Berlín et al.'s protocol. Each member in the family differs in the number of qubits employed. In the one qubit case we achieve the same bias as Berlín et al., ǫ = 0.4, while for two qubits the bias reduces to 0.3975. Numerical evidence based on semi-definite programming [23] suggests that the bias continues to decrease as the number of qubits is increased, but at a rapidly decreasing rate. Our protocol bears some similarity to the original BB84 CF protocol [22] and its various derivatives [3, 5, 19] , but significantly differs in that it is not based on bit-commitment.
II. A FAMILY OF LOSS-TOLERANT PROTOCOLS
The protocols read as follows:
1. Alice selects N orientationsα 1 toα N , where each of theα i is (uniformly) randomly picked from a set of four predetermined orientationsn, −n,m, and -m (which are known to Bob). Alice prepares N qubits polarized along these orientations, i.e. the first qubit is polarized alongα 1 , the second alongα 2 , etc., and sends these N qubits to Bob.
2. Bob selects N orientationsβ 1 toβ N , where each of theβ i is (uniformly) randomly picked from the set of two orientationsn andm, and then measures the polarization of the first qubit alongβ 1 , the polarization of the second along β 2 , etc.
3. If all the measurements are successful (i.e. he has detected the N qubits and has obtained N definite outcomes), he asks Alice to proceed with the protocol, otherwise, he asks her to restart the protocol (i.e. repeat step 1).
4. Alice sends Bob a randomly selected classical bit c.
5.
Let r 1 to r N denote the outcomes of Bob's N measurements. The outcome of the coin flip o is given by
Bob informs Alice of his choice of orientations,β i , and the corresponding outcomes, r i . 6. Alice aborts whenever there is at least one qubit that Bob claims to have successfully measured for which (1 − 2r)β = −α.
The loss tolerance of the protocol comes into play at step 3, where Bob asks Alice to restart the protocol whenever one or more of his measurements are unsuccessful, in which case the outcomes of the successful measurements are discarded. That is, Bob must successfully measure N -qubits in a single run of the protocol. Also note that we do not fix the angle between the axesn andm. Indeed, this angle is a free a parameter. In particular, it turns out that by manipulating it we can make the protocol 'fair' in the sense that Alice's and Bob's maximal biases are equal.
III. ALICE'S MAXIMAL BIAS
It will prove convenient to choose the coordinate system such thatn andm lie on the x z plane, spanning an angle of θ, −θ, respectively, from the z axis (see Fig. 1 ).
Since Bob is honest he will measure each qubit along one of the two axesn andm with equal probability. Suppose that Alice wishes to bias the outcome to 0. With no loss of generality we assume that Alice selects c = 0. Then the probability that she is successful equals
the superscript N serving to denote the number of qubits employed in the protocol. Introducing the operator
. . .
where Θ (x) is the Heaviside step function, we have that
Clearly, the maximum obtains when ρ equals the (normalized) eigenvector (or any one of the eigenvectors) of Π N corresponding to the greatest eigenvalue. Making use of the fact that
(and s 1 · s 2 · . . . · s N = 1 since Alice wishes to bias the outcome to 0), eq. (2) simplifies to
Here we use the notation
with 1 i denoting the identity operator on the Hilbert space of the i th qubit. The eigenvalues of Π N equal 1 ± cos N (θ) /2. The resulting biases are thus given by
since the probability of biasing to 0 and 1 are patently equal.
IV. BOB'S MAXIMAL BIAS
In the following it will prove economical to employ the following notation:
= ↓m , so that the basis |↑n , |↓n (|↑m , |↓m ) is denoted by 0 (1). In addition, we define ψ
The loss-tolerant nature of the protocol allows (a dishonest) Bob to carry out a measurement at step 2 to decide whether to keep the N the qubits. Only when he has decided to keep them does he proceed to step 4. Then, depending on the value of the classical bit c (received at step 4), he will carry out another measurement on the N qubits at step 5. The outcome of this measurement instructs him what N -tuples b and r to tell Alice that he selected and (supposedly) obtained, respectively. More specifically, at step 2 Bob will carry out a two-outcome POVM with elements Π p , Π rs = 1 − Π p . If he obtains the outcome associated with Π rs he asks Alice to restart the protocol. Otherwise, if he obtains the outcome associated with Π p , he keeps the qubits and they proceed to step 4. At step 5 Bob already knows the value of c. Let us assume that he would like to bias the outcome to 0, then to optimize his chances of being successful he will have to tell Alice announce an N -tuple r such that i r i = 0 ⊕ c = c. He will then carry out an additional POVM on the N -qubits with 2 2N −1 outcomes, which instructs him what N -tuples b and r to announce. We will denote this second POVM by Π r b 0 c , where the subscripts 0 and c correspond to the value to which Bob wants to bias the coin and the value of the classical bit sent by Alice, and the superscripts b and r correspond to the choice of bases and the associated outcomes that he sends Alice. Hence, a cheating strategy designed to obtain the outcome 0 consists of a set of three POVMs with elements {Π p , Π rs }, {Π Π p , which we note satisfy
Suppose now that Alice prepared at step 1 the state ψ
, and, having been asked to proceed with the protocol, sends Bob the classical bit c at step 4. Bob gets caught cheating when for one or more of the qubits, b i = a i and r i = s i ⊕ 1. Bob's minimal probability of being caught cheating therefore equals
where the summation is carried out over the set of all possible binary N -tuples, {a}, {b}, {s}, and {r | i r i = c}. The Heaviside step-function, additionally defined such that Θ (0)=0, serves to guarantee that only terms, which satisfy b i = a i and r i = s i ⊕ 1 for at least one i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, contribute. Finally, the 2 2N +1 factor is just the number of possible choices for the triplet c, a, and s.
Clearly, no value of c is in any way preferable for Bob, nor is any orientation or any particular qubit. This implies the existence of an optimal symmetric cheating strategy in the sense that all of the POVM elements (pertaining to both the POVM carried out when c = 0 and the POVM carried out when c = 1) contribute equally. To see this, we first assume the existence of an optimal (possibly asymmetric) strategy. Let {M 
where
, corresponding to rotations by π about the z axes of the coordinate systems of the set of qubits {i | u i = 1}. Similarly, for any binary N -tuple u, we obtain yet another optimal cheating strategy viaM
corresponding to rotations by π about the x axes of the coordinate systems of the set of qubits {i | u i = 1}. (When i u i = 1 we switch from a POVM corresponding to one value of c to a POVM corresponding to the other value.) Now a strategy in which Bob chooses at random between different optimal strategies is also optimal. By choosing uniformly at random between optimal strategies related by the transformations eqs. (10) and (11), Bob obtains an optimal strategy characterized by the positive operators
the only subtle point in the above argument concerns those transformations given by eq. (11) optimal cheating strategy the overall contribution to the cheating probability when c = 0 and c = 1 must be equal, and, moreover, eqs. (11) and the invariance of Π p under the application of the rotation operators, imply that in an optimal cheating strategy the sets {M (0= (0, . . . , 0) ). All other positive operators (including those corresponding to c = 1) can be obtained from it by the transformations eqs. (10) and (11) . In appendix A we prove that eqs. (8), (10) , (11) and (12) imply that one can take Π p = 1. This means that Bob stands nothing to gain by performing a measurement on the qubits prior to receiving the value of the classical bit c.
The problem of optimizing Bob's bias can be cast as an SDP (see [23] for an introduction). Using the fact that we can set Π p = 1 (and recalling that the rotation operators switch between all of Alices' preparations), the right-hand side of eq. (9) 
The SDP then reads
subject to 2
The derivation of the first two constraints is given in Appendix A. Now problems of this type, have associated with them a dual problem. The solution of this dual problem bounds from above the solution of the of the original problem, [23] , which we shall refer to as the 'primal' problem. It is given by
where the variables of the dual problem, the λ i , are real scalars.
A. The single qubit case
It is straightforward to solve both eqs. (14) and (15) in the single qubit case. The solution is given by
where the second equality follows from the equality of the probabilities of biasing to 0 and 1, and is obtained for 2M
Hence, Bob's strategy consists of measuring the polarization of the qubit along the x axis.
B. The two-qubit case
In the two qubit case Bob measures an eight outcome POVM M (r1, r1⊕c) b 0 c (recall that we have assumed that Bob wants to bias the outcome to 0). By introducing a new set of Lagrange multipliers ξ = λ 1 − λ 2 and χ = λ 1 + λ 2 , the dual problem can be reexpressed as
The solution obtains when i.e. when the lowest eigenvalue of the constraint matrix eq. (17) equals zero. Solving for χ in terms of ξ we get
(There is another solution χ = 1, but it can be shown that in this case the constraint matrix always admits a negative eigenvalue.) Plugging back into eq. (17), taking the derivative with respect to ξ, and equating to zero, we get a fourth order equation in ξ
When plugged back into eq. (17) three of the four roots do not give rise to expressions smaller to Bob's maximal bias in the single qubit case. See Fig. 2 . Hence, none of these three represents a solution of the primal problem since its solution must bound from above the solution of the dual problem and clearly Bob can always achieve a bias equal to that of the single qubit case by simply not following the directions of the protocol in the handling of only one of the qubits. It is straightforward to show that the remaining eigenvalue satisfies the constraints of the dual problem (i.e. all other three eigenvalues are positive), and therefore gives rise to an upper bound on Bob's maximal bias.
V. BIASES IN THE FAIR SCENARIO
To make the protocol fair, i.e. P
j * , we have the freedom to manipulate θ. In this way, for a single qubit we obtain P (1) * i = P To do so we conjecture that the solution of the primal problem, eq. (15) in the case N = 2, is of the form
and f is some real function of θ. It is easy to verify that eq. (21) satisfies the constraints eq. (15) . As a functional of f , the probability of biasing the outcome to 0 (or 1) then reads For θ ≃ 26.92
0 * is maximized for f ≃ 0.1177 equaling 0.8975 as anticipated.
We see that while Alice's maximal bias decreases with the increase in the number of qubits, Bob's maximal bias increases as we go from one to two qubits (see Fig. 2 ). For a greater number of qubits, numerical based SDP evidence indicates the bias in the fair scenario continue to decrease with the increase in the number of qubits (Bob's bias increases), but at an increasingly slower rate. We were able to carry out numerics for up to six qubits, and obtained P • ).
VI. CONCLUSION
It is possible to overcome the problem of losses in quantum CF. A loss-tolerant CF protocol has the property that its bias remains unchanged even if we allow for it to be restarted whenever losses occur. However, this robustness seems to come at a price. Berlín et al.'s loss-tolerant SCF protocol achieves a relatively high bias of 0.4. In this paper, by presenting a family of loss-tolerant SCF protocols, we were able to show that Berlín et al.'s result can be improved upon. Utilizing a single qubit we reproduced their result, while utilizing a pair of qubits we obtained a bias of 0.3975. SDP based numerical evidence indicates that the bias continues to decrease as the number of qubits is increased, but at a rapidly decreasing rate.
In future work it should be interesting to determine the theoretical limits on loss-tolerant CF protocols. Specifically, can Kitaev's bound be saturated by a loss-tolerant SCF protocol? If not, what is the bound on loss-tolerant SCF protocols? Furthermore, is it possible to introduce a loss-tolerant WCF protocol? Two main difficulties are apparent. First, at the end of a WCF protocol the losing party usually verifies the outcome by measuring a quantum system that has been kept in a quantum memory storage. Hence, in this scenario the losing party can always avoid losing by claiming to have lost the stored system. Second, the number of rounds of communication required to realize a CF protocol with a bias of ǫ is of the order of Ω(log log ǫ −1 ). In particular, to achieve a loss-tolerant WCF protocol with an arbitrarily small bias will require the protocol to be impervious to losses occurring at any round, implying that a dishonest party must not be capable of (probabilistically) inferring whether it is going to win or lose at at any round before the last.
